[3] Again, it has been shown that God wills other things in so far as He wills His own goodness. [6] It has also been shown that God understands through His essence, but not through any intelligible species added to His essence. This is not befitting in the first mover, for the perfect is prior to the imperfect. Now, the potency of matter extends both to form and to privation, since that which can be can also not-be. Hence, God is not at times living and at times not-living, but He always lives. For He moves in an infinite time, which can be done only by an infinite power, as we have proved above. For, if we saw conclusions in principles by knowing the principles themselves, there would be no discursiveness, as likewise there is not when we see something in a mirror. [9] It is thereby likewise evident that, although God transcends all sensible things and the sense itself, His effects, on which the demonstration proving His existence is based, are nevertheless sensible things. But through the same power through which it produces heat, the sun produces also many other effects among sublunary bodies-for example, dryness. [3] Again, towards the things to which it is not determined by nature the divine will is in a manner inclined through its intellect, as was shown above. [8] Moreover, if something can exist only when several elements come together, it is composite. He is, therefore, infinite. Nevertheless, it can also be said that the knowledge of potency and privation follows from the knowledge of act. So, too, among natural things, the simple are in potency with reference to the mixed, and the parts with reference to the whole. If, therefore, God is habitually knowing through His substance, considered in His substance He will not be universally perfect. [9] Again, he who knows a certain nature knows whether that nature is communicable. Thus, in no way does it seem that God can know singulars. For these “secrets of divine Wisdom” (Job 11:6) the divine Wisdom itself, which knows all things to the full, has deigned to reveal to men. It remains, therefore, that there cannot be falsity in the divine intellect. [2] For it was shown above that there is some being that must be through itself, and this is God. Therefore, the contingency of the things known is not in conflict with this necessity, since it may be that the intermediate causes are contingent. And in Wisdom (7:11), it is said of the divine wisdom: “All good things come to me together with her.”. The first mover of the heavens, therefore, is neither a body nor a power in a body. But the highest good cannot bear any mingling with evil, as neither can the highest hot thing bear any mingling with the cold. But in accord with its diverse conceptions our intellect devises diverse names that it attributes to God. The magnitude of its power likewise is measured from the magnitude of its action or its works. [1] From the divine perfection, which we have shown, we can conclude to the goodness of God. [2] For in equivocals by chance there is no order or reference of one to another, but it is entirely accidental that one name is applied to diverse things: the application of the name to one of them does not signify that it has an order to the other. Therefore, the divine will does not exclude contingency from the things it wills. Chapter 9 It is thus clear that those who place any faith in his words believe foolishly. THAT THE DIVINE WILL EXTENDS TO SINGULAR GOODS. Therefore, God is not in a genus. [6] The remark of Aristotle likewise agrees with this conclusion. [10] The first proposition is proved thus. The divine intellect surpasses the angelic intellect much more than the angelic surpasses the human. When these arguments were examined, through the efficacy of the abovementioned proof, and not the violent assault of arms or the promise of pleasure, and (what is most wonderful of all) in the midst of the tyranny of the persecutors, an innumerable throng of people, both simple and most learned, flocked to the Christian faith. [2] In part, however, the above opinion comes about because of a failure to distinguish between that which is self-evident in an absolute sense and that which is self-evident in relation to us. Hence, this proposition, every mover is moved by another, was not true by accident. For, on the basis of his intention to heal, a doctor does not necessarily have to give to a sick person the medicine without which the sick person can nevertheless be healed. [8] In the second way, Aristotle proves the proposition by induction [ Physics VIII, 4]. Brill 1965 edition, Leonine 1967-1979 edition, Marietti 1953 edition. [9] It is thereby likewise evident that, although God transcends all sensible things and the sense itself, His effects, on which the demonstration proving His existence is based, are nevertheless sensible things. THE SOLUTION OF THE ABOVE DIFFICULTY But, as we have proved, God’s being is His essence. It is also necessary that a self-moving being be divisible and have parts, since, as it is proved in the Physics [VI, 4], whatever is moved is divisible. But when that which is prior in nature is subsequent in our knowledge, then there is not the same order in analogicals according to reality and according to the meaning of the name.